

TESTA HECK TESTA & WHITE, P.A.

By: Michael L. Testa, Jr. (Atty. ID # 032092001)
mtestajr@testalawyers.com
Michael L. Testa, Sr. (Atty. ID # 020251975)
mtesta@testalawyers.com
Justin R. White (Atty. ID # 041792005)
jwhite@testalawyers.com

424 Landis Avenue
Vineland, NJ 08360
Telephone: (856) 691-2300
Facsimile: (856) 691-5655

Attorneys for Plaintiffs, New Jersey Republican State Committee a/k/a the NJGOP; Declan O'Scanlon; Hal Wirths; Lisa Natale-Contessa; and Ileana Schirmer

NEW JERSEY REPUBLICAN STATE
COMMITTEE a/k/a the NJGOP; DECLAN
O'SCANLON; HAL WIRTHS; LISA
NATALE-CONTESSA; and ILEANA
SCHIRMER

Plaintiffs,

vs.

PHILIP D. MURPHY, in his Official
Capacity as Governor of New Jersey;

Defendant.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
LAW DIVISION
MERCER COUNTY
DOCKET NO.:

CIVIL ACTION

**VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE
RELIEF**

Plaintiffs, New Jersey Republican State Committee a/k/a the NJGOP; Declan O'Scanlon; Hal Wirths; Lisa Natale-Contessa and Ileana Schirmer (collectively, "Plaintiffs") by way of Verified Complaint against Defendant, Philip D. Murphy, in his Official Capacity as Governor of New Jersey; hereby state:

NATURE OF ACTION

1. This action brought by Plaintiffs seeks injunctive relief against Defendant in the form of restraining Defendant from enacting Assembly Bill 4175 / Senate Bill 2697 in violation of the Debt Limitation Clause of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey.

THE PARTIES

2. Plaintiff, New Jersey Republican State Committee (the “NJGOP”) is an unincorporated association with an address of 150 W. State Street, Trenton, New Jersey 08608.

3. Plaintiff, Declan O’Scanlon, is an individual and a citizen and taxpayer of the State of New Jersey with an address of 21 Northvale Avenue, Little Silver, New Jersey, 07739.

4. Plaintiff, Hal Wirths, is an individual and a citizen and taxpayer of the State of New Jersey with an address of 12 Corwnall Court, Hamburg (Hardyston Twp.), New Jersey, 07419.

5. Plaintiff, Lisa Natale-Contessa, is an individual and a citizen and taxpayer of the State of New Jersey with an address of 829 Portobello Road, Toms River, New Jersey, 08753.

6. Plaintiff, Ileana Schirmer, is an individual and a citizen and taxpayer of the State of New Jersey with an address of 350 S. Lehigh Avenue, Hamilton Township, New Jersey 08619.

7. Defendant, Philip D. Murphy (“Defendant Murphy”), at all relevant times, is the Governor of the State of New Jersey, and is named as a defendant in his Official Capacity as such. As Governor of the State of New Jersey, Defendant Murphy is sworn to among other duties, diligently, faithfully and to the best of his knowledge, maintain and enforce the laws of the State of New Jersey. Governor Murphy’s official address is 225 W. State Street, Trenton, New Jersey 08625.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

8. Venue is appropriate in the Superior Court of Mercer County pursuant to Court Rule 4:3-2(2), as Defendant's official address is in Mercer County, and Defendant is an elected New Jersey public official whose actions affect real property in the county.

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS RELEVANT TO ALL COUNTS

9. All facts alleged herein are matters of public record and/or subject to judicial notice pursuant to N.J.R.E. 201.

10. On March 11, 2020, the World Health Organization declared the novel coronavirus (hereinafter "COVID-19") outbreak a pandemic, and on March 13, 2020, the President of the United States proclaimed that the COVID-19 outbreak constituted a national emergency.

11. On March 21, 2020, Defendant Murphy issued Executive Order No. 107, whereby it was ordered that for the most part all State residents remain home or at their place of residence except for certain very limited exceptions. Through this act all non-essential retail businesses were to be closed to the public.

12. Defendant Murphy renewed his stay at home orders, as well as ordered all non-essential retail business remain closed, with Executive Order 119 on April 7, 2020, Executive Order 138 on May 6, 2020, Executive Order 151 on June 4, 2020, and Executive Order 162 on July 2, 2020.

13. As a result of Defendant Murphy's actions, the State of New Jersey's economy has been severely impacted, and as a direct result, the State of New Jersey will experience a budget shortfall entering fiscal year 2020.

14. As a response to the anticipated shortfall, and in an attempt to restart the State economy and recover from the financial problems resulting from the COVID-19 Pandemic, on

May 28, 2020 the New Jersey State Assembly introduced Assembly Bill 4175, entitled the “New Jersey COVID-19 Emergency Bond Act” (hereinafter the “Bill”).

15. On July 16, 2020, the New Jersey State Senate passed their chamber’s version of the Bill, S-2697.

16. Having passed both chambers of the New Jersey legislature, the Bill is expected to be signed into law by Defendant Murphy, imminently.

17. The Bill authorizes the issuance of up to 9.9 billion dollars (\$9,900,000,000.00) in State general obligation bonds to be used for the purpose of responding to the fiscal exigencies caused by the COVID-19 Pandemic.

18. In addition, section 4(d) of the Bill authorizes bonds to be issued in the form of short-term notes to provide effective cash flow management for revenues and expenditures of the General Fund and the Property Tax Relief Fund in the implementation of the annual appropriations acts for Fiscal Year 2020 and Fiscal Year 2021.

19. This debt would be issued for the purpose of budget-financing in fiscal years 2020 and 2021, and the Bill permits refinancing that debt, including with long-term bonds maturing decades from now.

20. Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, the “Appropriations Clause”, holds that “[n]o general appropriation law or other law appropriating money for any State purpose shall be enacted if the appropriation contained therein, together with all prior appropriations made for the same fiscal period, shall exceed the total amount of revenue on hand and anticipated which will be available to meet such appropriations during such fiscal period.”

21. Further, Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 3(b) of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, the “Debt Limitation Clause”, holds that “[t]he Legislature shall not, in any manner, create in any fiscal year a debt or debts, liability or liabilities of the State, which together with any previous debts or liabilities shall exceed at any time one per centum of the total amount appropriated by the general appropriation law for that fiscal year”.

22. However, paragraph 3(e) holds that “[t]his paragraph shall not be construed to refer to any money that has been or may be deposited with this State by the government of the United States. Nor shall anything in this paragraph contained apply to the creation of any debts or liabilities for purposes of war, or to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection or to meet an emergency caused by disaster or act of God.”

23. The Supreme Court has defined the term “revenue” as it is use in the appropriations clause to exclude bond proceeds because, according to the Court, bond proceeds are not considered revenue for budgetary purposes. Lance v. McGreevey 180 N.J. 590, 596 (2004).

24. The holding in Lance v. McGreevey set forth the important principle that borrowed money cannot be considered revenue.

25. As a result, general obligation bonds issued under the exception to the debt limitation clause cannot be considered revenue for the purpose of balancing a future budget.

26. On May 7, 2020, the Office of Legislative Services (“OLS”) issued an opinion wherein they determined that while revenue shortfalls related to the COVID-19 disaster may persist for some or all of the fiscal year, there will not be a precipitous and unforeseen shortfall, but rather an anticipated decline in revenue. A true and correct copy of the OLS opinion is attached as Exhibit “A”.

27. While the Supreme Court's ruling in Lance v. McGreevey only sets forth the purpose of the appropriations clause generally, the Court held that "borrowed monies, which themselves are a form of expenditure when repaid, are not income and cannot be used for the purpose of funding or balancing any portion of the budget pertaining to general costs without violating the Appropriations Clause." Lance, supra, 180 N.J. at 598.

28. Section 4(d) of the Bill directly contradicts the limitations set forth in Article VIII, Section 2, paragraphs 2 of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, as well as the Supreme Court's holding in Lance v. McGreevey.

29. As such, Defendant must be enjoined from enacting and enforcing Assembly Bill 4175 / Senate Bill 2697 as doing so would be a violation of the Debt Limitation Clause of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey.

COUNT ONE

(DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF)

30. Plaintiffs repeat and reassert each and every allegation contained in the foregoing paragraphs as is set forth at length herein.

31. Defendant's enactment of Assembly Bill 4175 / Senate Bill 2697 would be in direct violation of the Debt Limitation Clause of the Constitution of the State of New Jersey and the Supreme Court's holding in Lance v. McGreevey.

WHEREFORE, Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the challenged Bill violates the Constitution of the State of New Jersey, as well as a permanent injunction against further infringement of their rights under these clauses, enjoining Defendant from enacting into law and/or enforcing the Bill and from passing any further order or rules similar to the invalid ones described in this action, along with any and all relief the Court deems equitable and just.

JURY DEMAND

DEMAND is hereby made for a trial by jury on all issues triable herein.

DESIGNATION OF TRIAL COUNSEL

Pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4:25-4, the Court is hereby advised that **MICHAEL L. TESTA, SR., ESQ.** has been designated Trial Counsel in the matter.

RULE 1:38-7(b) CERTIFICATION

I certify that Confidential Personal Identifiers have been redacted from documents now submitted to the Court and will be redacted from all documents submitted in the future in accordance with Rule 1:38-7(b).

TESTA HECK TESTA & WHITE, P.A.
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

Dated: July 16, 2020

By: s/ Michael L. Testa, Jr.
MICHAEL L. TESTA, JR.
MICHAEL L. TESTA, SR.
JUSTIN R. WHITE

RULE 4:5-1 CERTIFICATION

I certify, in accordance with R. 4:5-1, to the best of my knowledge and belief, the matter in controversy is not the subject of any other action pending in any other court or of a pending arbitration proceeding, no other action or arbitration proceeding is contemplated, and there are no other parties know who should be joined in this action.

Dated: July 16, 2020

By: s/ Michael L. Testa, Jr.
MICHAEL L. TESTA, JR.

VERIFICATION

I, Douglas J. Steinhardt, do hereby certify:

1. I am the chairman and authorized agent of the New Jersey Republican State Committee a/k/a the NJGOP. The NJGOP is a Plaintiff in this matter. As such, I have knowledge of relevant facts.

2. The facts alleged in the Plaintiffs' Verified Complaint are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and understanding.



Dated: July 16, 2020

DOUGLAS J. STEINHARDT
Chairman, NJGOP

EXHIBIT “A”

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STATE HOUSE ANNEX • P.O. BOX 068 • TRENTON,
NJ 08625-0068
www.njleg.state.nj.us

LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL
609-847-3901

Jason M. Krajewski
Legislative Counsel

Marci Levin Hochman
*First Assistant Legislative
Counsel, Ethics Counsel*

Gabriel R. Neville
Assistant Legislative Counsel

Roger Lai
Assistant Legislative Counsel

Katelyn McElmoyl
Assistant Legislative Counsel

May 7, 2020

Assembly Republican Leader Jon M. Bramnick:
Assembly Republican Office
P.O. Box 098
Trenton, NJ 08625-0098

Dear Assemblyman Bramnick:

Mr. Kevin Logan of your staff requested an opinion regarding whether or not the State may issue general obligation bonds without voter approval to meet the needs of the State arising from the COVID-19 pandemic. Specifically, he asked whether the exception to the debt limitation clause “to meet an emergency caused by disaster or act of God” in Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 3, subparagraph e., would apply to the issuance of debt to combat the COVID-19 pandemic, and whether the proceeds of such bonds may be considered revenue for purposes of an appropriations act.

BORROWING FOR A DISASTER

It is the opinion of Legislative Counsel that the COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster contemplated by the debt limitation exception and the State therefore may issue bonds, without the usual requirement for voter approval, to meet COVID-19 related emergency needs.

The Constitutional parameters for the conduct of the State’s fiscal affairs are set forth in Article VIII, Section II. They include the requirement for a single fiscal year, a balanced budget and a limitation on incurring debt. Paragraph 2 of section II sets forth the requirement for an annual and balanced budget.

No money shall be drawn from the State treasury but for appropriations made by law. All moneys for the support of the State government and for all other State purposes as far as can be

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ascertained or reasonably foreseen, shall be provided for in one general appropriation law covering one and the same fiscal year....
 [N.J.Const. (1947), Art. VIII, § II, par. 2.]

The courts have referred to this paragraph as, “. . . the center beam of the State's fiscal structure. It cannot in any sense be regarded as merely providing governmental "housekeeping details," necessary and important but not truly vital. See Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 304-305 (1977). Its terms must therefore be given full and complete effect in accordance with their clear and obvious intent.” City of Camden v. Byrne. 82 N.J. 133, 151, (1980).

Paragraph 3 of Section II prohibits the State from incurring debt in an amount exceeding 1 percent of the appropriations in the general appropriation law for that fiscal year, unless the debt is approved at a general election and other conditions are met. Sub-paragraph e provides an exception to this debt limitation.

This paragraph shall not be construed to refer to any money that has been or may be deposited with this State by the government of the United States. Nor shall anything in this paragraph contained apply to the creation of any debts or liabilities for purposes of war, or to repel invasion, or to suppress insurrection or to meet an emergency caused by disaster or act of God. (emphasis added)

The final clause, “or to meet an emergency caused by disaster or act of God” was added when the 1947 Constitution was drafted. The proceedings of the constitutional convention do not provide a robust explanation for this clause. A statement from the committee on Taxation and Finance noted that the clause had practically been put in effect “in 1932 by the Legislature and looked upon with a great deal of propriety by the people of the State because those things had to be done.” Constitutional Convention of 1947, Convention Proceedings, Volume I, at 149.

Although the Constitution does not define the terms “disaster” or “act of God,” the New Jersey Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical meaning.” Vreeland v. Byrne, 72 N.J. 292, 302, (1977) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The Oxford American Dictionary defines disaster as, “a sudden event, such as an accident or a natural catastrophe, that causes great damage or loss of life.” Oxford American College Dictionary (1st edition, 2002).

It is worth noting that there is an instructive statutory corollary. When the Legislature enacted The Civilian Defense and Disaster Control Act (N.J.S.A. App.A.:9-33 et seq), which grants the Governor emergency powers, it defined disaster as “any unusual incident resulting from natural or unnatural causes which endangers the health, safety or resources of the residents of one or more municipalities of the State, and which is or may become too large in scope or unusual in type to be handled in its entirety by regular municipal operating services.” The Governor invoked this statutory authority in Executive Order No. 103 of 2020, which responds directly to the

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COVID-19 pandemic. Based on the history of Article VIII, Section II, Paragraph 3e, the plain meaning of the term disaster, and the Legislature's subsequent use of that term in relevant law, it is reasonable to conclude that the debt limitation exception applies to a COVID-19 pandemic.

In summary, the Constitution requires the enactment of an annual, balanced budget free from borrowing unless that borrowing is either approved by the voters or is to meet an emergency caused by disaster. The COVID-19 pandemic is the type of disaster contemplated by the Constitutional exception. The exception to the debt limit clause allows the State to incur debt through the issuance of general obligations bonds without voter approval "to meet an emergency caused by [COVID-19]."

BORROWING FOR REVENUE

It is also the opinion of Legislative Counsel that borrowing to supplement revenue for future fiscal year budgets would violate Article VIII, Section II of the Constitution and the principles set forth by the New Jersey Supreme Court in Lance V. McGreevey 180 N.J. 590 (2004).

The drafters' inclusion of the paragraph 3e exceptions to the debt limitation clause allows borrowing money where the anticipated revenue certified in accordance with Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2 of the Constitution becomes insufficient due to an unexpected event. However, the Constitution does not define "emergency" or the meaning of "to meet an emergency."

The other exceptions to the debt limitation clause contained in paragraph 3e are: "for purposes of war," "to repel invasion," and "to suppress insurrection." Each is a discrete problem that sets forth a nexus test. For example, if the State needs to borrow money "for purposes of war" it may do so as long as the expenditure has a nexus to the war. Borrowing to buy warfighting equipment and weapons falls clearly within this provision. An ancient maxim of statutory construction is that the meaning of words may be indicated and controlled by those with which they are associated. This maxim, *noscitur a sociis*, applies to associated words in a manner similar to application of the more familiar doctrine of *in pari materia* to statutes covering the same subject matter. Germann v. Matris, 55 N.J. 193, 210 (1970), see also Soto v. Scaringelli, 189 N.J. 558, 572 (2006). Read in context with the other exceptions in paragraph 3e, "to meet an emergency" appears to be limited to borrowing to directly resolve the presently identifiable emergency. Consequently, just as the purchase of weapons bears a nexus to "for purposes of war" it is clear that purchasing ventilators and personal protective equipment bears a nexus to meeting the COVID-19 emergency. It is also reasonable to argue that the sudden, unanticipated and precipitous shortfall of expected revenue, resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic is the type of emergency contemplated by paragraph 3e. At the time the appropriations act was enacted, anticipated revenue was determined without knowledge of the COVID-19 pandemic. The shortfall of revenue in the current fiscal year was unanticipated and caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. Therefore it is fair to conclude that the State can borrow both for expenses directly addressing COVID-19 and to meet the needs of the State at the time the 2020 appropriations act was enacted. That is, the State can borrow to replace certified, anticipated revenue that was never realized due to COVID-19.

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As noted above, Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2 of the Constitution provides that all spending as far as can be ascertained or reasonably foreseen must be provided in a single appropriations law and further requires that no appropriations law may be enacted if the appropriations exceed the revenue on hand and anticipated during the relevant fiscal period. The debt limitation exceptions apply only to the general prohibition against borrowing and the requirement for voter-approval within paragraph 3. The exceptions do not provide an exemption to the balanced budget requirements of paragraph 2.

The language and structure of Article VIII, Section II indicate that exceptions to the debt limitation clause are intended only to allow the State to address a specific, unforeseen spending need that arises notwithstanding the Legislature's and Governor's previous compliance with the anticipated revenue certification, and balanced budget provisions of Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2. When a Fiscal Year 2021 budget is adopted, normal constitutional procedures, including revenue certification and balanced budget requirements will apply. While revenue shortfalls related to the COVID-19 disaster may persist for some or all of the fiscal year, there will not be a precipitous and unforeseen shortfall, but rather an anticipated decline in revenue. Borrowing to supplement anticipated revenue is inconsistent with the purpose of Article VIII, Section II, paragraph 2 (a balanced budget) and has been expressly rejected by the New Jersey Supreme Court:

the question is whether the constitutional framers would have considered the Appropriations Act, relying as it does on \$1.9 billion in borrowed monies to fund general expenses, to be consistent with a "balanced budget." (For purposes of our analysis, general expenses include the ordinary, operating, and day-to-day costs of government.) The short answer is no. We cannot reasonably find that the current Appropriations Act constitutes a balanced budget without defeating the very purpose behind the Appropriations Clause. That purpose is to bar the State from adopting an annual budget in which expenditures exceed revenues. [Lance v. McGreevey 180 N.J. 590, 596 (1980).]

The Supreme Court's ruling in Lance v. McGreevey, not only sets forth the purpose of the appropriations clause generally, it also defines the term "revenue" as it is used in the appropriations clause to exclude bond proceeds because, according to the Court, bond proceeds are not considered revenue for budgetary purposes. Lance at 593. The Court held that "borrowed monies, which themselves are a form of expenditure when repaid, are not income (i.e., revenues) and cannot be used for the purpose of funding or balancing any portion of the budget pertaining to general costs without violating the Appropriations Clause." Id. at 598. Although that case concerned the State's issuance of *appropriations-backed bonds* and the Court did not address *general obligation bonds* issued under the emergency exception to the debt limit clause, it set forth the important principle that borrowed money cannot be considered revenue. As a result, even general obligation bonds

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issued under the exception to the debt limitation clause cannot be considered revenue for the purpose of balancing a future budget.

In conclusion, The COVID-19 pandemic is a disaster that that has resulted in an emergency as contemplated by the New Jersey Constitution. Accordingly, the State may borrow money to meet the emergency caused by COVID -19 without voter approval and without violating the debt limitation clause. The proceeds of the bonds are borrowed money and may be used to pay for equipment and expenses directly related to COVID-19. This opinion sets forth justification for using borrowed money to pay for COVID-19 related equipment and to meet the needs of the State previously determined when the FY2020 budget was enacted. However, borrowed money may not be used to replace general revenue to support non-COVID-19 related spending in future budgets. What future expenses are directly related to COVID-19 is a matter to be resolved jointly by the Legislative and Executive Branches through the legislative process, including future budget acts.

Respectfully.

Jason M. Krajewski
Legislative Counsel

By: /s/ N. Lang
Neal Lang
Associate Counsel

JK: