

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
IN AND FOR LEON COUNTY, FLORIDA
CIRCUIT CIVIL DIVISION

FLORIDA EDUCATION ASSOCIATION; STEFANIE)
BETH MILLER; LADARA ROYAL; MINDY FESTGE;)
VICTORIA DUBLINO-HENJES; ANDRES HENJES;)
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT)
OF COLORED PEOPLE, INC., and NAACP FLORIDA)
STATE CONFERENCE,)

Case No. 2020 CA 001450

Plaintiffs,)

vs.)

RON DESANTIS, in his official capacity as Governor of the)
State of Florida; RICHARD CORCORAN, in his official)
capacity as Florida Commissioner of Education; FLORIDA)
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; FLORIDA BOARD OF)
EDUCATION; and, CARLOS GIMENEZ, in his official)
capacity as Mayor of Miami-Dade County,)

Defendants.)

MONIQUE BELLEFLUER, individually and on behalf of)
D.B. Jr., M.B., and D.B.; KATHRYN HAMMOND;)
ASHLEY MONROE, and JAMES LIS)

Case No. 2020 CA 001467

Plaintiffs,)

vs.)

RON DESANTIS, Governor of Florida, in his official)
capacity as Chief Executive Officer of the State of Florida;)
ANDY TUCK, in his official capacity as the chair of the State)
Board of Education; STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION;)
RICHARD CORCORAN, in his official capacity as)
Commissioner of the Florida Department of Education;)
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION; JACOB)
OLIVA, in in his official capacity as Chancellor, Division of)
Public Schools;)

Defendants.)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR TEMPORARY INJUNCTION

The Court conducted a hearing on August 19, 20, and 21, 2020, on Plaintiffs' expedited motions for temporary injunction. All parties were represented by counsel in the hearing. Because of the COVID-19 pandemic, this judge conducted the hearing via remote technology from the Leon County Courthouse, where he alone was physically present in the hearing.

The hearing involved the two consolidated cases reflected in the case caption. Case number 2020 CA 1467 was filed in Orange County on July 19, 2020. Case number 2020 CA 1450 was filed in Miami-Dade County on July 20, 2020. Both cases involved an emergency order entered July 6, 2020 by Defendant Richard Corcoran, Commissioner of the Florida Department of Education. Both cases were transferred to Leon County on August 6, 2020 and assigned to this judge.

This order pertains to Defendants (1) Education Commissioner Corcoran, (2) Ron DeSantis, Governor of Florida, (3) the Florida Department of Education, and (4) the other State Defendants listed in the case caption. Plaintiffs in the two cases are (1) the Florida Education Association ("FEA"), (2) the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, Inc., (3) NAACP Florida State Conference, (4) several individual teachers, and (5) several individual parents.

In the hearing 14 witnesses testified and numerous others submitted written declarations which were admitted into evidence. Approximately 100 exhibits were also admitted. The Court has considered the evidence, the matters of record, argument of counsel, and the applicable law. Based upon those considerations the motion for temporary injunction is granted as provided in this order.

THESE CASES' PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On March 9, 2020, Governor DeSantis, in Executive Order 20–52, declared a state of emergency in Florida due to the COVID-19 pandemic. His order was based largely on findings of the World Health Organization (“WHO”) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”).

On March 23, 2020, Education Commissioner Corcoran issued Emergency Order 20-EO-1 strongly recommending school closures and suspending strict adherence to the Florida Education Code. About that time, according to Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 (a report of the Florida Department of Health), there were less than 50 reported cases of COVID-19 in Florida. Schools were closed because of the pandemic. At the time of this Court’s present order, about 5 months later, there have been approximately 600,000 COVID-19 cases in Florida and more than 10,000 Florida residents have died of that disease. Commissioner Corcoran stated in his March 23 order recommending the continued closure of schools “COVID – 19 poses a severe threat to the entire State of Florida.” He was certainly correct.

After March 23 students across Florida switched to a distance learning platform for the remainder of the 2019-2020 academic year. As a result of the pandemic, whether schools would reopen for traditional face-to-face learning in August 2020 remained uncertain until early July.

On July 6 Commissioner Corcoran removed that uncertainty by issuing Emergency Order 2020-EO-6 (the “Order”). That Order is the subject of the cases presently before the Court. The Order states that school districts statewide must submit a reopening plan that satisfies the requirements of the Order to receive “reporting flexibility and financial continuity.” Importantly, the Order waives the October 2020 student surveys which determine school funding based on the number of students physically in the classroom at that time. The Department of Education will

approve or reject each reopening plan submitted. Only school districts with approved plans will receive the statutory waivers contained in the Order. In order to receive approval, a school reopening plan must be consistent with the following language in the Order:

Upon reopening in August, all school boards and charter school governing boards must open brick and mortar schools at least five days per week for all students, subject to advice and orders of the Florida Department of Health, local departments of health, Executive Order 20-149 and subsequent executive orders. Absent these directives, the day-to-day decision to open or close a school must always rest locally with the board or executive most closely associated with a school, the superintendent or school board in the case of district-run school, the charter governing board in the case of a public charter school or the private school principal, director or governing board in the case of a nonpublic school.

The cases before the Court seek an injunction preventing Defendants from forcing schools statewide to reopen unsafely without regard for local COVID-19 conditions, and seek a declaration from this Court that forcing such statewide reopening of schools is a violation of Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution. The FEA Plaintiffs also seek an injunction and a declaration that the Order is arbitrary and capricious in violation of Article I, Section 9 of the Florida Constitution.

According to Plaintiffs, the Order unconstitutionally burdens the safety of schools by conditioning funding on a reopening plan that provides a brick and mortar option in August, regardless of the dangers posed to Florida by this pandemic. Moreover, Plaintiffs claim the Order is arbitrary and capricious both on its face and in its application across Florida. In response, Defendants argue the Order is a reasonable exercise of emergency powers by the executive branch that balances their constitutional obligations to Florida's students against risk of harm from the unprecedented pandemic. At this juncture, Plaintiffs seek temporary injunctive relief staying the

requirements of the Order to preserve the status quo while the parties litigate the merits of their claims.

LEGAL STANDARD

To obtain a temporary injunction, the moving party must establish (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) lack of an adequate remedy at law; (3) irreparable harm absent the entry of an injunction; and (4) that injunctive relief will serve the public interest. *Gainesville Woman Care, LLC v. State*, 210 So. 3d 1243, 1258 (Fla. 2017); *Florida Department of Health v. Florigrown, LLC*, No. 1D18-4471, 2019 WL 2943329, at *2 (Fla. 1st DCA July 9, 2019). “The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo until a final hearing may be held and the dispute resolved.” *Bailey v. Christo*, 453 So. 2d 1134, 1136–37 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). “One critical purpose of temporary injunctions is to prevent injury so that a party will not be forced to seek redress for damages after they have occurred.” *Id.* at 1137. “The granting of a temporary injunction rests in the trial court’s sound judicial discretion, guided by established rules and principles of equity jurisprudence in view of the facts of the particular case.” *Id.*

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

SUBSTANTIAL LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS

“A substantial likelihood of success on the merits requires a showing of only *likely* or probable, rather than *certain* success.” *Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo*, 358 F. Supp. 2d 1161, 1164 (M.D. Fla. 2005) (emphasis in original). Article IX, Section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution provides:

The education of children is a fundamental value of the people of the State of Florida. It is, therefore, a paramount duty of the state to make adequate provision for the education of all children residing within its borders. Adequate provision shall be made by law for a uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality system of free

public schools that allows students to obtain a high-quality education...

Accordingly, our Florida Constitution requires the State to ensure our schools operate safely. Defendants, however, through the Order and its application, have essentially ignored the requirement of school safety by requiring the statewide opening of brick-and-mortar schools to receive already allocated funding.

The Order requires all local school districts throughout Florida to open brick and mortar schools by Monday, August 31, 2020. Defendants point out that more than 60 school districts have already submitted reopening plans calling for brick and mortar reopening in August; no school district has joined in this litigation; and no official representative of any school district testified regarding any coercion to reopen its schools. Defendants interpret that as meaning the local school boards agreed with this Order requiring brick and mortar opening.

But the school boards have no choice. The Order expressly states that upon reopening in August all school districts must open brick and mortar schools at least five days per week. Several reopening plans were admitted as exhibits in this hearing. In each of those plans the Department of Education includes language that states “the district must agree to ALL of the assurances by checking the corresponding boxes.” Assurance 1, the first box on the form, which must be agreed to by the local district, states in pertinent part: “upon reopening in August, the district will assure that all brick and mortar schools are open at least five days per week for all students...”

The districts have no meaningful alternative. If an individual school district chooses safety, that is, delaying the start of schools until it individually determines it is safe to do so for its county, it risks losing state funding, even though every student is being taught.

This policy “runs afoul of the Supreme Court’s long-standing admonition that the government ‘may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that infringes his constitutionally

protected interests.” Lebron v. Secretary, Fla. Department of Children and Families, 710 F.3d 1202, 1217 (11th Cir. 2013). “Under the well-settled doctrine of unconstitutional conditions, the government may not require a person to give up a constitutional right in exchange for a discretionary benefit conferred by the government where the benefit sought has little or no relationships to the right.” Id. Put another way, “what the state may not do directly it may not do indirectly.” Id. Because Defendants cannot constitutionally directly force schools statewide to reopen without regard to safety during a global pandemic, they cannot do it indirectly by threatening loss of funding through the Order.

The case of Hillsborough County is illustrative. The Hillsborough County School Board called a special board meeting on August 6, 2020 with a panel of seven doctors to assess whether it was safe to reopen schools based on the current levels of COVID-19 in the community. Under the language of the Order, schools must open in August “subject to advice and orders of the Florida Department of Health [and] local departments of health[.]” Therefore, in an effort to comply with the Order, the Hillsborough School Board asked each doctor on the panel whether he or she believed it was safe to reopen schools. Five of the seven doctors stated it was not safe at that time. One of the doctors stated it was not safe that day but maybe it would be in a few weeks. The seventh doctor, the director of the local health department, declined to give an opinion. Based on the medical information at that meeting, the Hillsborough County School Board voted to delay the start of in-person learning by three weeks, from August 24, 2020 to September 14, 2020. Virtual learning would still begin on August 24, 2020.

The next day, August 7, 2020, the Superintendent and Chair of the Hillsborough County School Board received a letter from Commissioner Corcoran stating their proposal was not consistent with the Order. If they chose not to revise their plan, they would not receive the financial

flexibility otherwise available under the Order. After another proposal, to delay reopening until September 7, was also rejected, Hillsborough County voted to reopen brick and mortar schools August 31, 2020. They had no real choice. Defendants arbitrarily prioritized reopening schools statewide in August over safety and the advice of health experts; and all school districts complied in order to avoid a drastic loss of State funding.

As stated earlier, the Order states the day-to-day decision to open or close a school rests locally with the school boards, subject to the advice of local health officials. Although that language sounds good, it is essentially meaningless. Plaintiffs presented convincing evidence that State health officials were instructed not to provide an opinion on the reopening of schools. Local school boards asked State health officials for their opinions as to whether it was safe to open their schools. They would not give any opinion. Video evidence of school board meetings indicated several school boards' frustration with the lack of help in that regard. Local school boards wanted to know – is it safe to open our schools in our county? Defendants reduced the constitutional guarantee of a safe education to an empty promise, in violation of the Florida Constitution.

With regard to Plaintiffs' claim that the Order is arbitrary and capricious, Plaintiffs have also met their burden. This Court recognizes that is a very high burden. Plaintiffs have “to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the State’s education policies... were not rationally related to the provision ‘by law’ for a ‘uniform, efficient, safe, secure, and high-quality system of free public schools that allows students to obtain a high-quality education.” *Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc. v. Florida State Board of Education*, 232 So.3d 1163, 1172 (Fla 1st DCA 2017). That case provides that this standard applies in all cases challenging the State’s compliance with its obligations under the Constitution, and that deference in these matters is crucial to avoid intrusion by the courts into legislative and executive authority.

But the Citizens for Strong Schools case is distinguishable from the present case. In the Citizens for Strong Schools case the appellate court dealt only with whether the State had violated its paramount duty to provide a uniform, efficient and high-quality system of free public schools. It concluded there were no judicially manageable standards to make that valuation. Thus, asking the courts to do so involved a violation of the separation of powers doctrine.

The Citizens for Strong Schools appellate case did not involve the paramount duty to provide “safe” schools. The trial judge in that case, in his well-written final judgment, stated “however it cannot be said that every education issue is debatable. The terms in Article IX relating to ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ are subject to judicially manageable standards. This Court believes that the terms ‘safe’ and ‘secure’ are different from the terms ‘efficient’ and ‘high-quality.’ Florida’s trial courts deal with issues relating to safety and security all day long. Allegations of unsafe or unsecure schools can be measured differently and more definitively than can terms like ‘efficient’ and ‘high-quality.’” *Citizens for Strong Schools, Inc., et al. v. Florida State Board of Education, et al.*, No. 2009-CA-4534 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 2018). Significantly, the First DCA declined to address “safe” schools in its appellate opinion.

Article I, Section IX of the Florida Constitution provides “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law...” If a statute or government order is arbitrary and capricious, it violates due process rights guaranteed by the Florida Constitution. See *State v. Saiez*, 489 So. 2d 1125, 1128 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986). A government act is arbitrary and capricious if it is taken with improper motive, without reason, or is meaningless. See *City of Sweetwater v. Solo Const. Corp.*, 823 So.2d 798 (Fla. 3d DCA 2002). Moreover, an order is unconstitutional if it is vague and susceptible to arbitrary and capricious application. See *State v. Jenkins*, 454 So. 2d 79, 80 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984).

Here, the evidence established that the Department of Education allowed Miami-Dade County, Broward County, and Palm Beach County to begin the school year with distance learning until September 30 or beyond when virus indicators improve for those districts. These counties were permitted to heed the advice of local health experts. However, when Hillsborough and Monroe County attempted to adopt similar plans Defendants denied their proposals. Department of Education official Jacob Oliva explained that this was because Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach Counties are in phase 1 of reopening. But there is no mention of “phases” in the Order. Without prescribed standards for approval of plans, the Commissioner has engaged in ad hoc and unconstitutional decision making without considering local safety and the medical opinions of experts, local or otherwise. Indeed, the Department of Health, the agency charged with making health and safety related decisions in the State of Florida, was noticeably absent from the Defendants’ decision-making process.

Both parties presented expert testimony regarding the COVID-19 pandemic. The medical literature is clearly still in flux and difficult to parse. Defendants’ expert, Dr. Jay Bhattacharya, a professor at the Stanford University Department of Medicine, testified he does not think he will ever again work on such a deadly epidemic in his lifetime.

To what extent children ultimately transmit the virus to adults is still to be determined. The CDC in its report entitled *The Importance of Reopening America’s Schools this Fall*, updated July 23, 2020, provides “international studies that have assessed how readily COVID-19 spreads in schools also reveal low rates of transmission when community transmission is low. Based on current data, the rate of infection among younger school children, and from students to teachers, has been low, especially if proper precautions are followed.” Thus, according to the CDC, authorities must consider both community transmission rates and proper precautions.

In addition, when considering children in schools, this covers a wide age range. Kindergartners generally start school at age 5 or 6. Elementary school will typically run until about age 10-12. High school will run until about age 17 – 19. Many of our students are able to vote or sign contracts by the time they graduate.

The Order takes none of that into consideration. It fails to mention consideration of community transmission rates, varying ages of students, or proper precautions. What has been clearly established is there is no easy decision and opening schools will most likely increase COVID-19 cases in Florida. Thus, Plaintiffs have demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success in procuring a judgment declaring the Order is being applied arbitrarily across Florida.

Plaintiffs presented various theories of arbitrary and capricious state action. Defendants' witness testified Commissioner Corcoran entered the Order because school districts and school superintendents were asking for guidance regarding how State funding and the October survey would work if parents and students chose, in large numbers, to continue distance learning in the fall semester. According to Defendants, the Order was intended to ensure flexibility in funding as school districts determined their reopening plans. However, there is no evidence in the record that in order to provide flexibility in funding or waivers of certain statutes, Defendants must require school districts to provide a brick and mortar option no later than August 31, 2020. Significantly, Commissioner Corcoran suspended the Florida Education Code on March 23, 2020 without reference to dates or conditions. Thus, the stated goal of providing funding guidance to the school districts was an unfounded premise for entering an Order that threatens to withhold funding if school districts do not provide a brick and mortar option in August.

Interestingly, this hearing was done remotely, via Zoom technology. That is because it has been decided it is unsafe to hold in person trials in the Leon County courthouse during this highly

dangerous pandemic. That was a local decision based on local conditions. Because of COVID-19, jurors and witnesses are not allowed to come into our courtrooms, almost all of which are larger than classrooms in our schools. Additionally, Defendants' medical expert is a distinguished research doctor who teaches at Stanford University. Although he testified it is safe enough to reopen our schools, he also admitted Stanford University will not be holding in-person classes in the fall. Classes there will be taught remotely because of the pandemic.

The evidence was clear that teachers want to be back in school. Our teachers are the foundation of our educational system. They chose to teach because they have a passion for teaching our children. They want to be in the classroom interacting with their students. But the evidence was clear that there are teachers falling hard through the cracks because of this Order. The evidence demonstrated that some teachers are being told they must go back into classrooms under extremely unsafe conditions. There is not room in many classrooms for social distancing. There is not room to put desks 4 feet apart, much less 6 feet apart as is recommended. Students entering and leaving classrooms are inherently close together. Despite school rules, some might be wearing masks and some not. Teachers have not been provided adequate personal protection equipment. They are asked to sanitize their classrooms in five minutes between classes.

Some teachers have medical conditions that make them particularly susceptible to COVID-19. Many teachers are also parents. Some of their children have medical conditions that make them particularly susceptible to COVID-19. Some teachers live with other people, such as their spouses, parents or friends, who may be particularly susceptible to COVID-19. Video clips of the Governor and Education Commissioner were entered into evidence with those officials saying teachers who cannot teach face-to-face will be able to teach remotely. But that option is not being provided to

all teachers. Some teachers are being forced to quit their profession in order to avoid an unsafe teaching environment.

Plaintiffs have established a substantial likelihood of success on the merits.

IRREPARABLE HARM AND INADEQUATE REMEDY AT LAW

The Court finds Plaintiffs have established irreparable harm and an inadequate remedy at law. An injury is irreparable, and thus supports the issuance of a temporary injunction, where the potential damages may be calculated only by conjecture and not by an accurate standard. *JonJuan Salon, Inc. v. Acosta*, 922 So.2d 1081, 1084 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006). Plaintiffs presented evidence that teachers throughout the State are deciding whether to retire, resign, or put themselves and their families in harms' way. One witness testified that because of his pre-existing condition, his doctor advised he will likely die if he contacts COVID-19. If he is forced to return to school, he will be risking his life on a daily basis. The cost of life of teachers and their family members cannot be readily calculated.

Plaintiffs presented evidence that the most widely prevailing standard for determining when the virus is under control and it is safe to reopen schools is a 5% positivity rate in the affected area, in this case the local school district. The evidence showed that the World Health Organization and the Florida Chapter of the American Academy of Pediatrics use this standard in their guidelines and advisory opinions. Defendants did not present an alternative safety standard.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs cannot meet their burden of establishing irreparable harm because teachers can choose to take sick leave, retire early, file workers compensation claims, or go through the grievance procedures in their collective bargaining agreements. But a teacher must become sick before taking sick leave or filing workers compensation claims. The purpose of an injunction is to prevent injury before damages occur. Furthermore, the grievance process though

the union's collective bargaining agreements only affords a teacher relief when due to a breach of the collective bargaining agreement. Collective bargaining arbitrators do not have jurisdiction or authority to decide constitutional questions like those pending before this Court.

There is simply no adequate remedy at law available to Plaintiffs under these circumstances. They will suffer irreparable harm. Thus, Plaintiffs have met these elements.

PUBLIC INTEREST

Plaintiffs have also shown that a temporary injunction will serve the public interest. An injunction in this case will allow local school boards to make safety determinations for the reopening of schools without financial penalty. This is what the local school boards were elected to do. Every witness testified that any decision to reopen schools should be based on local conditions. Reasoned and data-driven decisions based on local conditions will minimize further community spread of COVID-19, severe illness, and possible death of children, teachers and school staff, their families, and the community at large. Such local decisions unequivocally serve the public interest.

SEVERABILITY OF UNCONSTITUTIONAL PORTIONS

The Plaintiffs ask the Court to sever the unconstitutional portions of the Order.

When a part of a statute is declared unconstitutional the remainder of the act will be permitted to stand provided: (1) the unconstitutional provisions can be separated from the remaining valid provisions, (2) the legislative purpose expressed in the valid provisions can be accomplished independently of those which are void, (3) the good and the bad features are not so inseparable in substance that it can be said that the Legislature would have passed the one without the other and, (4) an act complete in itself remains after the invalid provisions are stricken.

Schmitt v State, 590 So. 2d 404, 415 (Fla. 1991). The Court finds that each of these elements is met here. There is no legal basis to treat this Order differently from a statute. The illegal language in the Order can be separated from the valid language "without rendering the enactment

nonsensical or otherwise changing its essential meaning beyond what is necessary to cure the constitutional defect.” Id.

Schools should reopen when the local decision-makers determine upon advice of medical experts, that it is safe to do so. Our Constitution requires safe schools. The Court, therefore, severs Section III, the requirement of a reopening plan, and any reference to statutory waivers being conditioned upon said “approved reopening plans” and references to a required start date in August. The legislative purpose, as stated in the Order’s WHEREAS clauses, is to open schools consistent with safety precautions and ensure the continuity of funding and the educational process. These goals can be accomplished independently of the provisions that are unconstitutionally void. Schools will still reopen where it is safe, as many have, and continue to reopen slowly as conditions improve across the State. Plaintiffs and Defendants agree this is the ultimate goal: to get students back in school.

The Court finds that the good and bad features of the Order are not so inseparable in substance that the Department of Education would have passed the one without the other. Commissioner Corcoran suspended the Florida Education Code in March in response to a declared state of emergency. He did not condition this suspension or waiver on a date certain or upon any form of virtual learning plan from the districts. Lastly, after severance, the Order “would still meet the requirement of being complete in itself.” *Searcy, Denney, Scarola, Barnhart & Shipley v. State*, 209 So. 3d 1181, 1196 (Fla. 2017). The Order would still accomplish its intended purpose of providing flexibility and continuity in funding while remaining “consistent with safety precautions as defined by the Florida Department of Health, local health officials and supportive of Floridians.”

CONCLUSION

The Court finds Plaintiffs have met their burden. The Order is unconstitutional to the extent it arbitrarily disregards safety, denies local school boards decision making with respect to reopening brick and mortar schools, and conditions funding on an approved reopening plan with a start date in August. The Order will, however, pass constitutional muster if its unconstitutional portions are severed. And it would still require local school districts to provide a high-quality education, under the circumstances – the circumstances being this horrible pandemic.

Therefore, the Court strikes the following language:

I. Reopening Requirements.

a. All schools open. ~~Upon reopening in August, all school boards and charter school governing boards must open brick and mortar schools at least five days per week for all students, subject to advice and orders of the Florida Department of Health, local departments of health, Executive Order 20-149 and subsequent executive orders. Absent these directives, the day-to-day decision to open or close a school must always rest locally with the board or executive most closely associated with a school, the superintendent or school board in the case of a district-run school, the charter governing board in the case of a public charter school or the private school principal, director or governing board in the case of a nonpublic school. Strict compliance with requirements of section 1001.42(4)(f), Florida Statutes, requiring school districts to establish a uniform and fixed date for the opening and closing of schools is waived to the extent necessary to give effect to this Order. In addition, strict compliance with sections 1003.02 and 1011.60(2), Florida Statutes, requiring school districts to operate public schools for a minimum of 180 days or an hourly equivalent is waived to the extent necessary to give effect to this Order, consistent with an approved reopening plan. Further, strict compliance with the reporting requirements for educational planning and information, as set forth in section 1008.385, Florida Statutes, and Rule 6A-1.0014, Florida Administrative Code, is waived to the extent necessary to give effect to this Order, consistent with an approved reopening plan.~~

b. Full panoply of services. Pursuant to the authority granted in section 1001.10(8), Florida Statutes, school districts ~~boards~~ and charter school governing boards ~~must~~ **may** provide the full array of services that are required by law so that families who wish to educate their children in a brick and mortar school full time have the opportunity to do so; these services include in-person instruction (barring a state or local health directive to the contrary), specialized instruction and services for students with Individualized Education Programs (IEPs) or live synchronous or asynchronous instruction with the same curriculum as in-person instruction and the ability to interact with a student's teacher and peers as ~~approved~~

~~by the Commissioner of Education.~~ Required services must be provided to students from low-income families, students of migrant workers, students who are homeless, students with disabilities, students in foster care, students who are English Language Learners, and other vulnerable populations.

II. Reopening Plans – Strike entire section.

III. Reporting Flexibility and Financial Continuity.

School districts and charter school governing boards ~~with an approved reopening plan~~ will receive reporting flexibility that is designed to provide financial continuity for the 2020 fall semester.


- a. [remains as is]
- b. **Full FTE credit for innovative learning environments.** ~~Although it is anticipated that most students will return to full-time brick and mortar schools,~~ some parents will continue their child's education through innovative learning environments, often due to the medical vulnerability of the child or another family member who resides in the same household. As described in this Order, school boards and charter school governing boards ~~with an approved reopening plan~~ are authorized to report approved innovative learning students for full FTE credit. However, students receiving virtual education will continue to receive FTE credit as provided in section 1011.61(1)(c)1.b.(III)-(IV), Florida Statutes.
- c. [as is]

IV. [as is]

~~All of the statutory and rule waivers set forth in this Order for school districts and charter schools are contingent upon having an approved reopening plan for the 2020 fall semester.~~

The Court retains jurisdiction to enforce the provisions of this Order.

DONE and ORDERED in Tallahassee, Leon County, Florida, on this 24th day of August, 2020.



Hon. Charles Dodson
Circuit Judge

Copies furnished to all parties via E-Portal and email: