1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9	Robyn C. Crowther (SBN 193840) STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900 Los Angeles, CA 90071 Tel: (213) 439-9428 Fax: (213) 439-9599 rcrowther@steptoe.com  Michael B. Eisenberg (pro hac vice) STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas, 35th Fl New York, NY 10036 Tel: (212) 506-3931 Fax: (212) 506-3950 meisenberg@steptoe.com	Jamie L. Lucia (SBN 246163) STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP One Market Plaza Spear Tower, Suite 3900 San Francisco, CA 94105 Tel: (415) 365-6711 Fax: (415) 365-6681 jlucia@steptoe.com  Anna M. Targowska (pro hac vice) STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 227 West Monroe Street, Suite 4700 Chicago, IL 60606 Tel: (312) 577-1300 Fax: (312) 577-1370 atargowska@steptoe.com	
11		Attorneys for Defendant	
12		Lowe's Home Centers, LLC	
13			
14		TEC DICTRICT COURT	
15	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA		
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17	EPISTAR CORPORATION,	Case 2:17-cv-03219-JAK-KS	
18	Plaintiff,	Judge: Hon. John A. Kronstadt Magistrate: Hon. Karen L. Stevenson	
19	VS.		
20	LOWE'S HOME CENTERS, LLC,	Final Pretrial Conference: June 28, 2021 at 1:30 p.m.	
21	Defendant.	Motion Hearing Date: July 12, 2021 at 8:30 a.m.	
22			
23		Trial Date: July 13, 2021 at 9 a.m.	
24		DEFENDANT LOWE'S HOME	
25		CENTERS LLC'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO EPISTAR'S	
26 27		MOTION FOR CONTINUANCE OF TRIAL	
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On June 9, 2021, less than a month prior to the scheduled start of trial, Plaintiff Epistar Corporation ("Epistar") requested a trial continuance to November 2021. The history between the parties and their communications with the Court show that Epistar's request lacks good cause.

## I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND

On April 28, 2021, fifty-two business days (76 calendar days) before the scheduled start of trial, Courtroom Deputy Clerk Joseph Remigio contacted the parties via email to "confirm your intent to go forward with the Jury Trial set for 7/13/21 (FPTC 6/28/21)." (Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 1.) The next day counsel for Epistar responded confirming its intent "to go forward with the July 13, 2021 jury trial." (*Id.*) Counsel further explained "[a]t the Final Pretrial Conference, we may discuss with the Court the potential need for certain Epistar witnesses from Taiwan to testify via video." (*Id.* (emphasis added).) The undersigned counsel then responded on behalf of Defendant Lowe's Home Centers LLC ("Lowe's") stating "[w]hile circumstances are obviously not ideal, we will be prepared for trial to the extent that the Court is able to proceed on that schedule." (*Id.*)

On June 9, 2021, just twenty-three business days (34 calendar days) before the scheduled trial, after much of the ramp-up, preparations, and logistics have been made, Epistar submitted its motion claiming:

First, the possibility of vaccinations in Taiwan for the relevant individuals is remote at this time. Second, Taiwan is 15 hours ahead of California, and this time difference renders video testimony and witness preparation infeasible (as it would be the middle of the night for Epistar's witnesses). Third, Epistar's Legal Director (herself a key witness in this case) cannot reasonably monitor, supervise, or consult with outside counsel about the progress of trial in real time from across the world.

(Dkt. 335-1 at 1.) Absent from Epistar's motion is an explanation for what <u>changed</u> between April 28, 2021 (when it indicated that trial could proceed with testimony via video) and June 9, 2021 (when that predicted and predictable eventuality became

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> "Eisenberg Decl." refers to the June 14, 2021 Declaration of Michael B. Eisenberg in support of Lowe's Opposition filed concurrently herewith.

"severely prejudicial" to Epistar). Difficult schedules, appearances by video, and logistical hassles are not "good cause," but instead are <u>simply the realities of litigation in the Covid era</u>. Moreover, if Epistar had indicated its willingness to proceed with trial if and only if its Taiwan-based witnesses could attend in person, counsel for Lowe's would not have agreed that such a contingent plan to prepare for trial was reasonable or feasible.

## II. APPLICABLE STANDARD

There are two relevant standards for determining whether to modify a schedule under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. First, the Ninth Circuit has provided a four-factor standard:

First, we consider the extent of appellant's diligence in his [or her] efforts to ready his [or her] defense prior to the date set for hearing. Second, we consider how likely it is that the need for a continuance could have been met if the continuance had been granted. Third, we consider the extent to which granting the continuance would have inconvenienced the court and the opposing party, including its witnesses. Finally, we consider the extent to which the appellant might have suffered harm as a result of the district court's denial.

United States v. 2.61 Acres of Land, More or Less, Situated in Mariposa Cty., State of Cal., 791 F.2d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1985). Epistar asserts that the potential prejudice to the movant is the most "critical." Dkt. 335-1 at 3 (citing United States v. Wiggins, No. 1:19-po-00092-SAB, 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33833, at \*3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2020)). Epistar's characterization of the relevant standard is at best incomplete. The cited portion of Wiggins relies on United States v. Zamora-Hernandez, 222 F.3d 1046 (9th Cir. 2000), which in turn explains that "to prevail [an appellant] must still demonstrate 'at a minimum that he has suffered prejudice as a result of the denial of his request." Id. at 1049. In other words, the fourth factor is not the most important in the final analysis, but instead is a threshold issue. Id. Stated differently, a district court need not perform a discretionary analysis unless the moving party establishes potential harm. Indeed, Wiggins itself confirms that the fourth factor is critical because it is "mandatory." 2020 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 33833, at \*3 (quoting Danjaq LLC v. Sony Corp., 263 F.3d 942, 961 (9th Cir. 2001)). Nothing in Wiggins suggests that harm to the moving party is

predominant within the discretionary analysis. The Court should factor Epistar's questionable legal analysis when applying its discretion.

Although harm to the moving party is necessary, once that threshold is met, courts in the Ninth Circuit generally focus on the <u>diligence</u> of the moving party. *See Johnson v. Mammoth Recreations, Inc.*, 975 F.2d 604, 609 (9th Cir. 1992). A leading case discussing the diligence standard is *Jackson v. Laureate, Inc.*, 186 F.R.D. 605 (E.D. Cal. 1999), which explains:

[T]o demonstrate diligence under Rule 16's "good cause" standard, the movant may be required to show the following: (1) that she was diligent in assisting the Court in creating a workable Rule 16 order . . .; (2) that her noncompliance with a Rule 16 deadline occurred or will occur, notwithstanding her diligent efforts to comply, because of the development of matters which could not have been reasonably foreseen or anticipated at the time of the Rule 16 scheduling conference . . .; and (3) that she was diligent in seeking amendment of the Rule 16 order, once it became apparent that she could not comply with the order

*Id.* at 608 (emphasis added, internal citations omitted); *accord Del Rio v. Virgin Am., Inc.*, No. CV 18-1063, 2019 WL 210957, at \*2 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 3, 2019) (finding lack of diligence under *Jackson*, 186 F.R.D. at 608).

## III. ARGUMENT

Simply put, "good cause" does not exist here because the issues raised by Epistar were not merely <u>reasonably foreseeable</u> at the time it agreed to proceed with trial, but instead were <u>expressly acknowledged</u>. Epistar and its counsel were aware that the Covid-19 pandemic was affecting both Taiwan and the United States. Epistar and its counsel were also undeniably aware of "the potential need for certain Epistar witnesses from Taiwan to testify via video." (Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 1.) Rather than an unexpected circumstance that only later became apparent, Epistar agreed to the trial date with

knowledge of and despite the very harms it now cites.<sup>2</sup>

Moreover, had Epistar honestly stated that it would proceed with the trial if and only if its witnesses could appear in person, it is unlikely that Lowe's (or perhaps even the Court) would have agreed to move forward based on that contingent and uncontrollable circumstance. Instead, Epistar blithely consented in the apparent hope that the world and the pandemic would comply with its hopes. The alleged harms that Epistar will suffer, therefore, are solely of Epistar's own making.

In addition, Epistar's assertion that "[a] continuance should not cause much inconvenience to Lowe's (or its witnesses)" is not well taken. The parties have proceeded under a series of trial dates, with Lowe's' preparations progressing through fits and starts. That circumstance, though suffered by many litigants during the Covid-19 era, is far more than a mere inconvenience. Each time the potential ramp up to trial begins, witness and attorney schedules are set, vacations and alternative plans are cancelled, and travel arrangements are made. Preparations with the individual witnesses then begin, with the time spent preparing occurring again for each newly set schedule. Time is expended in both its chronological and corresponding financial sense for each and every false start. As the plaintiff, Epistar might care little about the additional effort imposed upon an already expensive litigation process, but that nonchalance is far from universal.

Epistar's failure to even acknowledge the Court and its schedule is also striking. Rather than a remote or theoretical concept, the 2.61 Acres of Land decision cited by Epistar expressly mentions the potential inconvenience to the Court as an important factor. 791 F.2d 666, 671 (9th Cir. 1985). While Lowe's does not claim to speak on the Court's behalf, courts nationwide have confirmed that dockets and schedules are less than healthy as the country reopens. A schedule opening that is sufficient for a weekplus trial is not to be taken for granted. Epistar's insistence that its own difficulties and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> Epistar's reference to the 15-hour time difference is particularly galling, as the distance between Taiwan and Los Angeles has not changed since April.

convenience must dominate the analysis is both unrealistic and frustrating.

In addition, the undersigned counsel understands that Epistar's counsel in this case also represents the plaintiff in *Cyntec Co., Ltd. v. Chilisin Electronics Corp.*, No. 4:18-cv-00939-PJH (N.D. Cal. filed Feb. 14, 2018). A joint case management statement in *Cyntec* (Eisenberg Decl. Ex. 2) dated May 13, 2021, indicates that a trial is scheduled for August 23, 2021 and that the plaintiff (represented by Epistar's counsel) similarly requested the right to have certain Taiwanese witnesses testify remotely "because of the current COVID-19 situation in Taiwan." *Id.* Epistar and its counsel fail to explain why they waited weeks after acknowledging the situation in Taiwan to inform the Court or its opponent of the alleged "inconvenience."

Lowe's further notes that "inconvenience" to the party seeking continuance is not necessarily coextensive with the types of "harm" encompassed by fourth 2.61 Acres of Land factor. Trial, by its very nature, is not particularly convenient. In fact, the harm identified in 2.61 Acres of Land was a complete bar to the corporate defendant presenting a defense. 791 F.2d at 671 (finding an abuse of discretion for failure to grant a short continuance to permit the corporate defendant to be reinstated). Epistar identifies no legal support for the argument that testifying via video (as previously agreed to by the party seeking continuance) is a sufficient harm to merit continuance.

Finally, should the Court apply its discretion to continue the trial, the Court need not accede to its assumption that a slot will necessarily be available in November. Instead, the Court should consider all avenues to ameliorate the harm already suffered by Lowe's and minimize additional harm as the case again shambles toward trial.

## IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Lowe's requests that Epistar's request for continuance be denied.

1	DATED:	June 14, 2021	Respectfully submitted,
2	DATED.	June 14, 2021	Respectivity submitted,
			/s/ Michael B. Eisenberg
3 4			Michael B. Eisenberg (pro hac vice)
5			STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 1114 Avenue of the Americas, 35th Floor
6			New York, NY 10036 Tel: (212) 506-3931
			Fax: (212) 506-3950
7			meisenberg@steptoe.com
8			Jamie L. Lucia (SBN 246163)
9			STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP One Market Plaza
10			Spear Tower, Suite 3900
11			San Francisco, CA 94105
			Tel: (415) 365-6711 Fax: (415) 365-6681
12			jlucia@steptoe.com
13			Anna M. Targowska (pro hac vice)
14			STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP
15			227 West Monroe Street, Suite 4700 Chicago, IL 60606
			Tel: (312) 577-1300
16			Fax: (312) 577-1370
17			atargowska@steptoe.com
18			Robyn C. Crowther (SBN 193840)
19			STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP 633 West Fifth Street, Suite 1900
20			Los Angeles, CA 90071
			Tel: (213) 439-9428 Fax: (213) 439-9599
21			rcrowther@steptoe.com
22			Attorneys for Defendant
23			Lowe's Home Centers, LLC
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27			
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE** The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has been served on June 14, 2021 via electronic mail on all counsel of record. /s/Anna M. Targowska Anna M. Targowska