During their first day of in-person oral arguments in 18 months, the justices sought clarifications on how they should interpret a provision in the Armed Career Criminal Act, which provides a minimum sentence of 15 years in prison for offenders convicted of federal gun crimes who have committed three or more felonies "on occasions different from one another."
William Dale Wooden was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition, in violation of federal law, and convicted at trial in 2015. At first, prosecutors recommended a 21-month sentence, but then changed their minds, arguing Wooden was a career criminal for the purpose of the act.
The district court sentenced him to 15 and a half years in prison, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed the sentence in 2019.
Prosecutors have argued that Wooden had passed the three-offense threshold. They cited a house burglary in 2005 and a separate burglary of a mini-storage facility in 1997 — the latter of which resulted in 10 different convictions.
In his petition for certiorari, which he filed in July 2020, Wooden argued the district court had erred in counting the storage burglary as 10 different offenses, and that the court of appeals made a mistake in adopting the government's wide interpretation of what meets the career criminal standard for the purpose of sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act.
Wooden asked the high court to strike down the law as "vague."
On Monday, Assistant Solicitor General Erica L. Ross reiterated the government's position, arguing two crimes are committed on different occasions if they involve different acts, even occurring at the same time, in the same place and in violation of the same law.
But several justices appeared to struggle with that view, finding it counterintuitive.
Justice Neil Gorsuch voiced his doubt through a hypothetical: a person shooting three people with a gun in the same place would constitute three different offenses, but in a different scenario, one person displaying a gun and robbing three people would be committing one offense for the purpose of the Armed Career Criminal Act, according to the government's view, he said.
"Who thinks that, Ms. Ross, in the real world?" Justice Gorsuch asked.
Justice Stephen Breyer, who also had trouble buying into Ross' argument, also showed his doubt with a made-up scenario: A person robbing people on a train going from car to car would meet the threshold of a career criminal, while another robbing multiple people in a single car wouldn't.
"If you can convince me Congress intended that at the same time that they passed this ... I'd like to hear it," Justice Breyer told Ross.
Justice Sonia Sotomayor echoed that skepticism, suggesting that common people would have a hard time using the government's view in defining Wooden as a career offender.
"Do you think the layperson would believe that that was a career — that this person was a career criminal?" the justice asked.
Both Ross and Wooden's pro-bono attorney, Allon Kedem of Arnold & Porter, touched often on the 1986 case U.S. v. Petty
.In that case, the Eighth Circuit affirmed a district court's determination that Samuel Petty, a defendant convicted for the armed robbery of six people at a restaurant, qualified for a sentencing enhancement.
To address a perceived unfairness with that outcome, Congress added the phrase "committed on occasions different from one another." But the law did not define what constitutes an occasion, and whether it is bound by time limits, by the legal elements of an offense or other factors.
Justice Samuel Alito expressed frustration about the law's vagueness on Monday.
"I have no idea what an occasion is," Justice Alito said.
In his argument, Kedem told the justices that they should reject the government's view, and stick to the language in the law.
"This court should read the occasions clause as it would be understood in plain English," Kedem said. "Mr. Wooden's mini-storage break-in was a single occasion involving 10 burglaries."
The justices found weaknesses in Wooden's arguments too.
Justice Clarence Thomas pressured Kedem to define how much time would have to pass between separate criminal acts to be considered different offenses.
"What if they took a smoke break? What if they decided to have lunch?" Justice Thomas asked. "Is that enough of a break?"
Kedem argued separate actions should be counted as a single offense if there is "a continuous stream of activity" between them but urged the high court to think beyond the time factor. Defining a career criminal will ultimately require a "qualitative" analysis of the circumstances in each case, which means a one-size-fits-all test won't work, he said.
"Qualitative what?" a frustrated Justice Alito responded. "What ultimately are we looking for?"
Justice Alito said he struggled to see what factors other than whether criminal acts were committed at the same point in time could be used to interpret the law's language referring to "occasions different from one another."
"I find it very difficult to determine what additional meaning the term has," Justice Alito said. "I don't fault you for your efforts, but they leave me scratching my head."
Wooden is represented by Allon Kedem of Arnold & Porter.
The government is represented by Erica L. Ross of the U.S. Solicitor General's Office.
The case is Wooden v. United States, case number 20-5279, in the Supreme Court of the United States.
--Editing by Alex Hubbard.